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Civil Enforceability of Religious
Prenuptial Agreements
MICHELLE GREENBERG-KOBRIN•

In the years since Perri Victor's divorce has been finalized,
she has tried to moue on with her life. She is raising a young
daughter from that marriage and finishing up law school.
Perri and Warren Victor were married in an Orthodox Jewish ceremony in Florida in 1976. They received a civil divorce in 1990. However, as an Observant Jew, Perri cannot
remarry until Warren gives her a Jewish religious divorce
known as a get. Since late 1987, she has been pleading with
Warren to give her a get. When Warren asked her to give up
a portion of her equity in the family home in exchange for the
get, she agreed. Realizing the power he had over Perri, Warren further demanded sole custody of their daughter before
he would grant the get. Perri refused. Vindictively, Warren
refused to give her a get. Thus, in the eyes of Jewish law, she
remains a married woman. Perri would like to date, remarry, perhaps have other children, but because Warren refuses to grant her a get, she is unable to. She is an agunah, 1

* Articles Ed., Colum. J . L. & Soc. Probs., 1998-1999. The author wishes to acknowledge the editorial assistance of Lauren Freeman-Bosworth, Mihui Pak, Maryanne Woo,
Jason Criss, and Leslie Wells. The author would also like to thank Rabbi Jeffrey Kobrin
for his continuous assistance with this article and ongoing support.
1. This article utilizes the term agunah (plural: agunot) because it has come to be
the accepted term to refer to women in this position. However, it is important to point
out that most of the women whom this title seeks to address are not technically agunot.
The classic case of the agunah, as discussed in the Talmud, is of a woman whose husband
has disappeared, for example at sea, or is missing in action at a battle, and it is unknown
as to whether he is alive or dead. Without proof of his death, the woman cannot remarry.
She must remain in a state of limbo, "chainedn to a man whose whereabouts (or death)
are unknown . See Babylonian Talmud: Yebamot at 12a. This differs from the case of
divorce where a more appropriate term would be "mesurau Beit Din,n literally, one who
has flaunted the court's authority. See Irving Breitowitz, Between Civil and Religious
Law: The Plight of the Agunah in Modern Society 15 (1993).
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literally, a chained woman, bound against her will to a man
she no longer loves.2
I. INTRODUCTION
An Observant Jew adheres to two sets of laws: the secular
laws of the country in which he or she lives and the Jewish legal
system. For example, an American couple that wished to observe
Jewish law would be married both religiously and civilly.3 Just
as a civil marriage only can end with a civil divorce or the death
of one of the parties, a Jewish marriage only can end with death
or Jewish divorce.4 Thus, a couple wishing to observe Jewish law
must obtain both a Jewish and a civil divorce.5
Because it is the state that originally confers marital status, a

2. Pamela Manson, Court's Aid Sought for Jewish Divorce, The Ariz. Rep., Jan. 3,
1994, at Bl.
3. See Irving Breitowitz, Between Civil and Religious Law: The Plight of the
Agunah in Modem Society, 1-2 (1993).
4. The Biblical source for Jewish divorce is found in Deuteronomy 24:1-4 ("When a
man takes a wife and marries her, and it comes to pass that she find no favor in his eyes,
becauee he has found something scandalous in her, then let him write her a bill of
divorcement and give it in her hand, and send her away out of his house."). See also
Babylonian Tabnud: Kiddushin at 2a ("She is freed [from marriage] by obtaining a get or
by her husband's death.").
At this point, a brief introduction t.o the Jewish legal literature is appropriate.
For observant Jews, the supreme source of law is the Pentatuch (the Five Books of Moses)
which contain laws relating t.o religious, civil, and criminal issues. Along with these
written laws, an oral tradition exists which supplements and explains the written law.
At the end of the third century CE, the oral law was compiled int.o a written code by
Rabbi Judah the Nasi called the Mishnah. The Mishnah served as an outline to the
corpus of the oral tradition. Centuries of discussion and exegesis of the Mishnah were
incorporated int.o the Talmud in the seventh century. There are two versions of the
Talmud, named afler the countries where they were redacted, the Palestinian and the
Babylonian. The Tabnud is not an organized code of black letter law, but a description
and discussion of various opinions, often without arriving at a definitive conclusion.
There were several attempts t.o codify the Tabnud and rabbinic discussion into a code of
definitive legal principles and rulings. Two of these codes which received near-universal
acceptance, are noted to in this article: the Mishnah Torah, by Maimonides (12th
centucy), and the Shulchan Aruch, by Rabbi YosefCaro (16th century).
5. See Deuteronomy 24:1--4 for Jewish divorce. See also Babylonian Tabnud:
Kiddushin at 2a. For a history of civil divorce, see Homer H. Clark, The Law of Domestic
Relations in America §15.8 at 110 (2d ed. 1988) ("The final [divorce] decree ... grant(s) the
dissolution of the marriage to one spouse or another, or in states permitting such a
decree, t.o both spouses.").
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civil judge has the power to dissolve a marriage.6 However, un
der Jewish law, both marriage and divorce are contractual rela
tionships between the parties.7 Because Jewish marriage begins
when the husband and wife enter into a contractual relationship
in which they each accept certain responsibilities towards one
another, it can only be brought to an end by a contractual recog
nition that those obligations have ceased.8 A Jewish divorce is a
contract,9 a get, stipulating that the marital obligations of the
couple have come to an end. 10 To be valid, a get must be freely
given by the husband, and freely accepted by the wife.11 The
original marriage contract, the ketubah, is then slashed to indi
cate its invalidity. 12
Without a get, an individual who recognizes the authority of
Jewish law cannot remarry, even if the individual receives a civil
divorce. Since the get is a contractual proceeding, if either the
husband or the wife refuses to participate, there cannot be a di
vorce agreement. The parties remain married in the eyes of
Jewish law. 13 The problem arises, as in the case of Perri Victor,
when one party wishes to be divorced, but the other party refuses
to grant or accept the divorce. The spouse wanting divorce is left
with two undesirable options: The .spouse can either abandon
her religious convictions by remarrying in a civil ceremony or in
another denomination of Judaism permitting remarriage without
a get,1'' or she can remain chained to the recalcitrant spouse.15
6. See Clark, supra note 5, at§ 15.1 at 72-73 ("Marriage occupies a special position
in our society such that it can only be dissolved by a court proceeding.•).
7. See Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin at 2a (discussing the occurrence of a
marriage established by the parties).
8. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 5-6.
9. See 5 Encyclopedia Talmudit "Get" at 568 (1973).
10. See id. A get can refer to any type of legal document. Its common usage is in
reference t.o divorce documents and that connotation is assumed wherever the term is
found unless otherwise indicated. See Tosafis, 2a, S.V. Hamavi; Babylonian Talmud,
Trudglat Gitten. A get states that 1) the husband divorces the wife, and thus no longer
has any rights in anything belonging t.o her; 2) a relationship no longer exists between
the two of them; 3) the purpose of it is for the wife t.o receive a divorce; and 4) the transfer
of it from the husband t.o the wife effectuates the divorce. 5 Encyclopedia Talmudit "Get"
at 568 (1973).
11. See 5 Encyclopedia Talmudit "Get• at 568 (1973). See also infra Section I.
12. See 5 Encyclopedia Talmudit "Get" at 568 (1973).
13. See id.
14. The Conservative and Orthodox movements do not permit the marrying of an
individual who does not have a get from a previous marriage. However, the Central
Council of American Rabbis (the Rabbinic arm of the Reform movement) has stated that
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The problem of the agunah has increased due to both the
gradually increasing divorce rate in the traditional Orthodox
community16 and the rise of distribution and custody statutes
that are more favorable to women than those at early common
law. Increasingly, some spouses, usually men, have withheld
religious divorces.17 They do so to secure concessions concerning
property, custody, alimony, or out of sheer maliciousness.18 In
response to the growing number of agunot, scholars and organi
zations have suggested a number of legal and communal re
sponses to free spouses in this situation. These proposed solu
tions include utilizing civil courts and state legislatures,19 media
tion,:io community pressure,1! 1 and the development of a Beit Din22
no get is needed in order to remarry. There is no official position on performing a new
marriage for a person who has refused to give his previous spouse a _get. Thus, the ethical
decision of whether to marry these individuals in a Reform ceremony is left to the
individual rabbis. However, some Reform rabbis, especially those of the younger
generations, have begun to focus more on this issue, and may insist on a get from the first
ceremony. Certainly, it is disingenuous to assume, as much of the literature does, that
most Reform rabbis will remarry a man whom they know has maliciously ref11Sed to
grant his wife a get. The Reconstructionist movement also permits remarriage without a
get. Conversation with Rabbi Jennifer Ro�•m (Mar. 17, 1998).
15. See Breitowitz, supra note 3 at 2 n.4. Although either party can refuse to
participate in the get process, in an overwhelming number of cases, it is the husband who
refuses. While not wishing to minimize the pain of those husbands whose wives refuse to
accept a get, this article will refer to the recalcitrant spouse as the husband unless
otherwise specified.
16. See Mica Schnieder, World Jewish Congress Study: Jews in Israel Will Surpass
U. S. Community, Jewish Telegraph Agency, Sept. 18, 1998, at 5. See also Judith
Forman, Pure Devotion: Elie Shochet and Abby Siegel Built a Renewed Faith and
Unbreakable Bond Through Orthodox Judaism, The Baltimore Sun, Sept. 5, 1998, at lF.
While the "current divorce rate [is] about 40 percent for United States first
marriages ... the rate is between three percent and four percent for Orthodox Jews." Id.
However, the divorce rate is rising.
17. See Nat Hentoff, Who Will Rescue the Jewish Women Chained in Limbo?, The
Village Voice, Sept. 13, 1983, at 6 (stating that there are some 15,000 agunot). But cf.
Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 2 n.4. The controversystems for a difference of opinion as to
whom should be considered an agunah (i.e. every woman who has a civil divorce but no
get, any woman who has appealed to a Beit Din for a get, only woman in whose cases the
Beit Din has issued a seruv against their husbands) as well as the lack of a centralized
organization that can accurately track this phenomenon.
18. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 1-2.
19. See infra Section III.
20. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 59. There are organizations that have mediation
counselors who attempt to help a couple arrive at an agreement to reach a get. See id.
21. For example, a group of Canadian women ref11Sed to have relations with their
husbands until a husband in the community gave his wife a get. The Agunah Problem,
The Jewish Press, Oct. 26, 1979, at M41.
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more open to the use of halahkic23 innovation to end the mar
riage. 24 All of these solutions are problematic in some way, and
none have been fully accepted by the entire observant commu
nity.
These attempts to address this problem focus on ex post solu
tions, once there is already a marriage that is dissolving and a
recalcitrant spouse who refuses to consent to the Jewish divorce.
This article, in contrast, focuses on an ex ante solution - a pre
nuptial agreement, essentially a secular contract signed before
the wedding ceremony, with the possibility of eliminating the
problem of the agunah in the future.25
Part II of this Article describes the development of the Jewish
laws of divorce, and the role of Jewish courts in the process of
Jewish divorce. Part III outlines the current status of Jewish
divorces in the United States. Part IV describes the response of
American courts and legislatures to the problem of a spouse who
refuses to give a get. It also describes the difficulties that arise
because of the interplay between Jewish and secular law. Part V
examines the development of religious prenuptial agreements. It
describes various types of prenuptial agreements and attempts
to use prenuptial agreements to resolve this issue within the af
fected Jewish community. Part VI describes the status of these
prenuptials under civil law, focusing on the constitutional issues
involved in the enforcement of these agreements by American
courts. It also looks at other possible legal alternatives for re22. Batei Din is the plural of Beit Din (also spelled as Beth Din), meaning local
Jewish court. See 3 Encyclopedia Talmudit, "Beit Din" 140-73 (1973).
23. The halakha is the Jewish legal system. Jewish law is composed of a single body
of law dealing with civil, criminal, and religious matters. See Menachem Elon, The
Principles of Jewish Law 5 (1974). The system has ita own procedural and substantive
rules derived from the Pentateuch and the interpretation of the Pentateuch as codified in
the Talmud. Id. at 19-20. See also Babylonian Talmud: Kiddushin 13b.
24. See Nadine Brozan, Annulling a Tradition: Rabbis Stir Furor by Helping
'Chained Women' Leave Their Husbands, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1998, at Bl. The Beit Din
Tzedek L'Baayot Agunot, or the Rademan Beit Din, as it has become known, is mired in
controversy. Rabbi Emanuel Rademan has attempted to resolve some cases of a.gunah
through a process called hafka'at kiddushin, which annuls original marriage and does not
require the appearance of the recalcitrant spouse. This process has been met with much
criticism, in part because it does not have a long-standing continuous tradition. Id. See
also Eric Greenberg, Court Strives to Inform Critics, The Jewish Week, Aug. 28, 1998, at
9.
25. There are several versions of this document. See Appendix for sample versions
of a prenuptial agreement. This article will discuss the idea of the prenuptial agreement
in general, focusing on specific provisions where necessary.
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solving the issue of a recalcitrant spouse. Finally, Part VII describes the halakhic implication of the prenuptial at Jewish law
and possible means to resolve the various difficulties that may
arise. This Article presents the effect of the interaction of civil
and Jewish law on both the enforceability and practicality of
these agreements. It also suggests steps to maximize the acceptance of these prenuptial agreements in civil and religious law.
II. THE JEWISH DIVORCE
The Jewish law of divorce has evolved over time. According to
Biblical law, the husband had the power to divorce his wife at
will. 26 In the tenth century, Gershomides, the leading Rabbinic
sage, issued a decree that is still binding, requiring that the
woman willingly accept the get for it to be valid, thus preventing
men from divorcing their wives without their consent.27 Since
the tenth century, Jewish law has required the get (similarly to
the ketubah) to be given willingly by the husband and to be accepted willingly by the wife.28 This approach of Jewish law is
analogous to the common law requirement that contracts are
invalid if entered into under duress.29
The role the Beit Din in marriage and divorce proceedings is
very different from the role of a court at common law because at
Jewish law, marriage and divorce are interpersonal contracts,30
in which the parties lay out their rights and duties to each other.
All that is needed are witnesses to the contract to effectuate the
marriage or divorce.31 Thus, the Beit Din is involved only in con26. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 6. See aleo Deuteronomy, 24:1--4; Rambam,
Mishnah Torah, Hilchot Gerushin 1:2 ("He can only divorce his wife willfully.").
27. See Rema, glosses on Shulchan Aruch: Even HaEzer 119:6 ("But Rabbenu
Gershom excommunicated those who would divorce a woman against her will:). This
decree is binding on all Ashkenazic Jews. There are two primary Jewish traditions,
Ashkenazic and Sephardic. The Ashkenazic Jews are those of European descent, while
Sephardic Jews are of Middle Eastern, African, Spanish and Portuguese descent. The
historical developments focused on in this article relate to the Ashkenazic community, as
the American Jewish community is overwhelmingly of Ashkenazic origin.
28. See id.
29. See Farnsworth on Contracts §4.19 at 272 (3d ed. 1992).
30. Riegenfeld v. Jacobson, 5 Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 96,
104 (1963).
31. Rambam, Mishnah Torah, Hilchot Gerushin 1:1 (describing the process of a get,
including the requirement of witnesses). Rambam is the Hebrew acronym for Rabbi
Moses Ben Maimon, commonly known as Maimonides. Witnesses for a get must be
acceptable under Jewish law which requires them to be: male, over the age of 13, of good
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tested divorces to determine the appropriateness of the parties to
get divorced.32
If a divorce is contested in a place and time where the Beit
Din's authority is recognized, the Beit Din hears the case.33 The
Beit Din inquires into two major issues: the basis for the divorce
and the settlement.34 If the husband instigates the divorce, he is
permitted to divorce his wife for a wide range of reasons.35 Al
ternatively, the wife wanting to divorce her husband can initiate
the divorce proceeding only in certain situations.36 Examples of
facts which allowed women to petition for divorce included impo
tence or sterility, physical or verbal abuse, habitual infidelity,
refusal to engage in sexual relations, refusal to provide financial
support to the wife, or forcing the wife to violate the halakha.
Other reasons would include certain changes in expectation or
status, such as the husband's becoming a non-believer, getting a
disease which rendered him repulsive to his wife, or engaging in

moral character, observant of Jewish laws, and unrelated to either husband or wife or to
the other witness. See Elon, supra note 23, at 606. See also Shulchan Aruch: Even
HaEzer 154:21 (stating that in order to get a divorce the hllllband is required to have a
scribe and two witnesses). While the presence of a rabbi is not required at the signing of
a get because it is an interpersonal contract, a rabbi or some other person well-versed in
Jewish law commonly performs the ceremony because of the law's intricacies and the
importance of ensuring a valid get. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 6. For the
requirement of witnesses during the wedding ceremony, see Rambam, Mishnah Torah,
Hilchot Ishut, 3:1-5, 4:6.
This approach is in contrast to that of most secular systems, in which the state
makes the determination of marital statllll, and one cannot get married or divorced
without the approval of the state. See Clark, supra note 5, § 2.1 at 73 ("Underlying all
aspects of the definition of marriage was the principle, frequently announced by the
courts, that the method of contracting marriage and the incidents of the relationship
were the province of the law and were not within the control of the parties."). Id.
32. See Elon, supra note 23, at 415.
33. See id. at 19-22.
34. See id. at 415. See also Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 154 (describing the cases
in which the parties should divorce, and cases in which the woman receives or forfeits the
monies stipulated in the ketubah).
35. Grounds for divorce include a wide range of reasons such as if his wife no longer
pleases him. While the School of Shamai holds that a husband should not divorce his
wife unless she has committed adultery, the School of Hillel permits divorce for
something as trivial as burning soup. See Babylonian Talmud: Gittin 90a-b. Some
believe that adultery is the only morally proper reason for divorcing one's wife. See
Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 119:3.
36. The Talmud stated certain categories of facts that allowed women to petition the
court for divorce. See Babylonian Talmud: Ketubot 77a. See also Shulchan Aruch Even
HaEzer 154.
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an occupation which rendered him physically repulsive.37
Based on the grounds for divorce, the court would issue a
finding of yotze or kofin. A decision of yotze means that the court
found valid grounds for divorce, and it would require the husband to grant the get, although it could not use coercive measures.38 Alternatively, a finding of kofin gives the wife a right to a
divorce rather a simple permission to divorce. In this more serious situation, the court would compel the husband to divorce his
wife.39 For example, a finding of kofin is appropriate if the husband were to refuse to support his wife financially or to engage
in sexual relations with her, thereby violating his contractual
obligation under the ketubah. 40 However, if the husband wished
to get a divorce because the couple had been married for a period
of ten years but were unable to have children, then a finding of
yotze would be appropriate.41
In a yotze situation, the court can enforce its decision only by
imposing psychological measures on the husband, such as community pressure or public proclamation of disobedience.42 Alternatively, if the court were to find that the situation was dire
enough to force the husband to grant the divorce - a kofin situation - the court could use coercive measures, including fines,
corporal punishment, imprisonment, or even threat of death to
insure compliance.43 The use of coercive measures seems to vio37. See Babylonian Talmud: Ketubot 77a. Some of these categories allowed the
woman to divorce with the financial settlement stipulated in the ketubah, but in some
instances, she forfeited her financial claim. See id.
38. See J. David Bleich, Jewish Divorce: Judicial Misconceptions and Possible
Means of Enforcement, 16 Conn. L. Rev. 201 (1984).
39. See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 154:21. Some of the categories are clearly
kofi,n or yotze, others depend on the particular facts. For example, a loathsome disease is
one of kofi,n, whereas the husband's refusal to co-habitate with his wife was one of yotze.
See Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 77a. For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see
Breit.owitz, supra note 3, at 42-43.
40. See id. at 154:3 ("He who says: I will not feed and I will not support.. .is forced to
divorce immediately, and so too he who refuses to have relations with his wife.n).
41. See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer, 154:10 ("[If] he married a woman and lived
with her ten years and she did not give birth, he should divrce her and pay her
ket ubah. ").
42. See id. ("They may decree upon all of Israel not to extend any favors to him or
cor,iduct any business dealings with him, nor circumcise his sons, nor bury them until he
divorces . ... n).
43. See Rambam, Mishnah Torah, Hilchot Gerushin 2:20 (" A Beit Din in every time
and every place can beat him [the recalcitrant husband] until he says "I want t.on [give
the get] and the get is written and it is kosher.n). See also, Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer
154:21.
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late the requirement that the get cannot be executed under du
ress. Maimonides, however, explains that the true will of every
person is to do what is right, and if they refuse to do so, that is
not their true will.44 Thus the husband's eventual consent to the
will of the Beit Din is his true desire.45 This "persuaded" consent
applies only to kofin divorces. In a non-kofin situation, a get that
is obtained through coercion results in an invalidation of the get
because it is a contract entered into under duress.46
III. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF GET PROCEEDINGS
The smooth functioning of the get proceeding in cases of con
tested divorce depended to a great extent on a strong judiciary
and a unified community. Both of these factors began to break
down in the eighteenth century. As Enlightenment ideals spread
throughout Europe, Jewish communities were emancipated.
Countries gave Jews citizenship, provided they relinquished
their judicial and legal autonomy. Jewish law continued to gov
ern private action and religious worship, but the applicable
secular law governed all other action.47 Marriage and divorce
sometimes remained within the Jewish community and some
times came under the secular authority's control.48 With the dis
solution of the autonomous Jewish community, the Beit Din lost
its official status.49 The power and influence of the Beit Din
shrank, especially as Jews came to view the use of the secular
courts as a promising development in the attainment of equality
44. See Rambam, Mishnah Torah, Hilchot Gerushin 2:20.
45. See id.
46. See Rema, glosses on Shulchan Aruch: Even HaEzer 154:21 ("It is fitting t.o be
stringent not t.o force (giving the get) so that it should not be a coerced get."). For a
discussion of whether this distinction is valid, see Breit.owitz, supra note 3, at 35 n.101.
47. Even though Jewish law has authority t.o govern civil law matters as well, in
countries such as the United States, where the courts are reliable and fair, most
observant Jews, even in disputes with other observant Jews, will refer civil matters t.o
secular courts instead of a Beit Din. See Isaac Herzog, The Main Institutions of Jewish
Law 28 (1980) (noting the difference between secular and Jewish law and describing the
various forces which led t.o the decline of Jewish courts).
48. Breit.owitz, supra note 3, at 164. For example, in some jurisdictions, even when
Jews were emancipat.ed, religious marriages and divorces continued t.o be recognized by
the government. One example was in England, where it was only in 1866 that the state
t.ook control of marriages and divorces from religious courts. Until that point, the
government recognized marriages and divorces performed by ecclesiastical officials or
courts. See id.
49. See Elon, supra note 23, at 19.
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ofrights.00
Many of the current Batei Din are not standing courts.51
Rather, similar to many arbitration tribunals, the Batei Din are
composed of three judges, where each party picks a judge, and
the two judges agree on a third. As temporary bodies, these
courts have limited influence.52 In addition, because each party
selects a judge, the courts are often subject to allegations of corruption, because the judges may be misperceived as advocates.53
However, some Batei Din are standing courts. They are often
connected with institutions or movements such as the Beth Din
of the Rabbinical Council of America, the Beit Din of the Agudat
HaRabbonim, and courts connected with specific Hasidic sects.54
These institutional courts tend to have slightly more influence.55
Today the Beit Din's power exists only to the extent that it is
recognized. The Beit Din's only real tool to enforce its determinations is communal pressure.56 However, the effectiveness of
the community pressure is compromised because a party can
move geographically, or change synagogue affiliation.57 A Beit
Din's decrees are supposed to represent Jewish law, but if litigants disagree with an outcome, they often condemn the court as
corrupt.58 Thus, Jewish courts are reluctant to even hold someone in contempt (issue a seruv) because they do not wish to issue
statements that are ignored.511
Thus, in secular society, a contested Jewish divorce has
proven to be most troublesome. If one party refuses to participate in the get proceeding, there is no way to compel him or her.
One can attempt to convince the recalcitrant party to participate
in the process, but even if the recalcitrant spouse appears before
a Beit Din, and the Beit Din orders the spouse to participate, the

50. See id. at 20-21.
51. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 15.
52. See id. This method of selecting judges is a principle known as zabla. See id.
53. See id. at 16. These courts work on the European inquisitional model, although
lawyers are permitted. See id.
54. See id. at 17 n.50.
55. See id. at 17.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. A seruv could result in some degree of communal ostracizing of the
individual. See id.
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Beit Din has no means of enforcing its decrees.00 Thus, one party
is forced to remain married to someone to whom they do not wish
to be married, without the possibility of dating and remarrying.

A. THE AGUNAH PROBLEM
The fragmentation of the Jewish community and the growing
prevalence of divorce factor heavily in the current agunah prob
lem. The fairly common occurrence in divorce cases where one
spouse is more observant than the other exacerbates the conflict.
One spouse may have nothing to lose in not participating in the
get process, because they may be comfortable remarrying without
one. As Rivka Haut, the director of Agunah Inc., a support and
service group for agunot has noted, "until 15 or 20 years ago, di
vorce in the Orthodox world was almost unheard. "6l Today,
about 21 percent of American Jews have been divorced.62 A sur
vey of 800,000 divorced Jews indicated that 113,000, approxi
mately 14 percent, had aget. 63
In the typical agunah case, the husband refuses to give his
wife a get until she makes concessions on property, alimony, visi
tation, or custody that otherwise would not be, or were not,
granted by the civil court. For example, "'Claire' worked with a
New York divorce-court judge to offer [her ex-husband] a 'fair
and reasonable compromise.'" Claire gave her husband $200,000
and accepted minimal child-support payments in exchange for a
get. "The package was extremely beneficial to him financially"
said Claire, who is now remarried, "but I took it because other
wise he never would have given me aget."64
In some instances, the husband does not want a divorce, and
will refuse to give a get in the hope that his wife will change her
mind and agree to remain married. For example, during Linda
R.'s five-year marriage, her husband drank and had a bad tem
per. He began abusing Linda until she fled with her toddler.
60. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 14-15.
61. Leanne Waxman, Orthodox Jewish Women Trapped in Bad Marriages, Seattle
Times, Dec. 17, 1995, atA16.
62. See id.
63. See id. Study done by Barry Kosmin, research director of the Council of Jewish
Federation, in 1990. At the time of the study there were three to four million adult Jews
in the United States. See id.
64. Abigail K. Leichman, When Marriages End Some Jewish Women are Left in
Limbo: Breaking Up is Hard to Do, The Record, July 17, 1996, at Rl.

370

Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems

[32:359

After the marriage collapsed, Linda spent two years as an agu
nah. "He was obsessed with me," said Linda R., 33. "It was, '[i]f
I can't have you, nobody can.' People don't know what to do with
us. It's a type of slavery. We're at their mercy."65 In other in
stances, such as an abusive relationship, the husband will refuse
to give a get out of spite. Such is the case of Hannah Fine, a
Queens resident and mother of three, whose husband, Larry
Fine, a divorce lawyer, withheld a get from her for seven years.
Upon finally receiving her get she remarked, "I can go to sleep
every night peacefully now... I feel a sense of relief you can't
•
•
rmagme. "66
If a husband who withholds a get then wishes to remarry in
an Orthodox or Conservative ceremony at a later date, he can
execute the get at that time, or if he wishes remarry in a Reform
or civil ceremony without executing the get.61 His wife will re
main an agunah, bound to a man from whom she is civilly di
vorced, unable to remarry except in a Reform or civil ceremony.68

IV.

ATTEMPTS AT CIVIL SOLUTIONS TO THE AGUNAH PROBLEM

A.

JUDICIAL RESPONSES

Some agunot have turned to the civil courts in an attempt to
arrive at a solution to the problem of a recalcitrant spouse. One
line of cases deals with an explicit agreement, usually in the civil
divorce decree, whereby the parties agree to give a get at a speci
fied time, usually simultaneously with receiving a civil divorce.
When one party fails to fulfill this obligation regarding the get,
the other party brings an action requesting specific
performance.69 Some jurisdictions have enforced these provi
sions, holding that they do not create First Amendment difficul65. Waxman, supra note 61, at Al6.
66. Deena Yellin, Get Breaks Orthodox Woman's Marital Chains, Newsday, March
9, 1997 at E2.
67. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 164 n.474.
68. See Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 4:1 Any children born from a subsequent
marriage without a prior get are considered mamzerim - children of adultery according to Jewish law. The children themselves bear this stigma, and may only marry
other mamzerim or converts. See generally Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 4:13.
69. See Waxstein v. Waxstein, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1976), affirmed 57 A.D.
863, 394 N.Y.S. 2d 253 (App. Div. 1977).
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ties. 70 The courts have stated that fulfilling the agreement does
not require a profession of faith,71 rather, that it simply requires
the party to perform an act to which he himself previously
agreed.72 For example, the court in Waxstein v. Waxstein13 up
held a provision of a separation agreement requiring a husband
to give a get. The wife had already transferred property as re
quired under the agreement.74
A second line of cases has gone farther and inferred agree
ments to give a get. These courts have found that marriage in a
religious ceremony or the clause in the ketubah indicating a
commitment to live "according to the laws of Moses and Israel"
infers a prior commitment to grant a divorce should the marriage
dissolve. 75 Thus, these courts have created a de facto prenuptial
agreement to give a get.
Courts enforcing an agreement to give a get, whether express
or implied, have provided two possible remedies.76 Some courts
have ordered the recalcitrant party to give (or receive) a get. 11
70. See Koepell v. Koepell, 138 N.Y.S. 2d 366 , 373 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (requiring the
husband to give a get in such an instance would simply be "requiring the defendant to do
what he voluntarily agreed to do."). See also Rubin v. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Fam. Ct.
1973). In Rubin, the wife refused to accept the get, which was a condition for her
receiving alimony. The court held that where one party to a get declines to perform, the
court will refuse any relief to the defaulting party until that party complies. Rubin at 68.
71. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
12. Koepell, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
73. 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
74. See id. at 881.
75. See Stern v. Stern, 5 Family Law Reporter (BNA) 2810 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1979); In re
Goldman 554 N.E.3d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that because the couple utilized an
Orthodox ketubah, even though they were married in a Reconstructionist ceremony, the
ketubah required the husband to give a get to end the marriage). See also Minkin v.
Minkin, 434 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. 1981); Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1987).
76. See e.g. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983); Minkin v. Minkin, 434
A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981); In Re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990) (stating that marriage and divorce are not religious events, but rather contrac
tual in nature); Cook v. Cook No. FA 90-0376937, 1992 Conn.Super. Lexis 1589 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 26, 1992) (holding that the court could compel both parties to participate
in obtaining the get); In re Scholl v. Scholl, 621 A.2d 808 (Del. 1992) (get provision is
proper because simply enforcing a contract that the husband had agreed to when he
agreed to the ketubah); Fleischer v. Fleischer, 586 So.2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that in participating in a ketubah ceremony, husband waived his First Amend
ment challenge to delivering the get); Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1987) (It is not a violation of the Establishment Clause to force the husband to sub
mit to the authority of the Beit Din since his refusal to give a get is not based on genuine
belieO.
77. See e.g. Minkin, 434 A.2d at 668; Scholl, 621 A.2d at 812.
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Other courts have required the party to appear before a Beit
Din. 78 This distinction between these two orders is significant
because of the interplay of religious and civil law. The prohibition against a coerced get ("get me useh ") invalidates a get that is
given or received under duress?' Thus, in most instances, any
coercion used to pressure the husband to give a get will result in
the invalidation of the subsequentget.80 Thus, for example, if the
civil court were to order a party to give his wife a get under
threat of incarceration, the get may be invalid as a get meuseh.81
In addition, the order might be construed as requiring the party
to perform a religious act, a direct violation of the First Amendment.82
The only possible exception to civil enforcement constituting a
get meuseh would be a situation where there is a prior finding of
kofin by the Beit Din.83 In these rare instances, the Beit Din will
apply the doctrine of constructive consent and permit coercive
measures,84 thus an order by the civil court to give a get might be
viewed by some Batei Din as a legitimate enforcement of their
judgment.85 However, under most circumstances, a direct order
78. See e.g. Koepell, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 375; Allitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 137; Burns, 538
A.2d at 266; Goldman 554 N.E.3d at 1021 (giving defendant choice of freely giving a get
or appearing before a Beit Din); Waxstein, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 788 (requiring parties to take
"whatever steps are necessary to secure a get either giving a get or appearing before the

Beit Din").
79. Babylonian Talmud: Gittin 88b ("A get meuseh entered into under duress is valid
if it is in accordance with a Beit Din's order to give a get, it is not valid if it is not in
accordance with a ruling of a Beit Din to give a geC).
80. See Rambam, Mishnah Torah, Hilchot Gerushin 2:20 (discussing when
compulsion is and is not permitted).
81. See Pal v. Pal 356 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1974). The court released the
husband from jail, after recognizing that jailing him would not result in a valid get, and
thus would not achieve the objective of alleviating the woman's plight. See id.
82. See infra Section V.B.
83. See J. David Bliech, Jewish Divorce: Judicial Misconceptions and Possible
Means of Enforcement, 16 Conn. L. Rev. 201 (1984) at 235.
84. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 15. These coercive measures include community
ostracism, restriction of honors in synagogue, and may include action by the secular court
to compel the get. See id. Corporal punishment has been allegedly used by certain
Hasidic sects, who use clandestine "enforcers" to carry out the decree of the Beit Din. See
Breitowitz at 35. Such coercion is rarely applied as findings of lwfin are relatively rare,
and most Beit Dins do not condone the use of violence as a means of enforcement. See
supra note 42-46 and accompaying text.
85. J. David Bleich, Jewish Divorce: Judicial Misconceptions and Possible Means of
Enforcement, 16 Conn. L Rev. 201 (1984). Rabbi J . David Bleich believes that in cases
where a lwfin situation is found, Jewish law would permit the secular court to order the
husband to give a get, and would recognize such a get as valid, provided that the secular

1999]

Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial Agreements

373

from a civil court to execute a get may indicate sufficient duress
to invalidate the get.86 If the court requires the party to appear
before a Beit Din, or simply suggests that the party give a get,
then a get given subsequent to such a suggestion will not suffer
the halakhic problems of a get meuseh.81
Other courts88 have refused to either enforce specific provi
sions or to infer an agreement to give a get on constitutional
grounds, arguing it would excessively entangle the state in sec
tarian matters. Such interference would thereby offend the Es
tablishment Clause or, on a narrower ground, would be beyond
the statutocy jurisdiction vested in the court.89

B.

LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS

In 1979, at the behest of the Agudat Israel of America (an
umbrella group for ultra-orthodox causes) the New York Legisla
ture considered the question of the agunah, and drafted the first
New York "get law." 90 In 1980, the legislature passed the bill
and Governor Cuomo signed it into law.91 Under this "get law", a
court does not do so directly, but rather compels the husband to follow the Beit Din's
finding. In such a case, the action of the civil court is considered ancillary to the decision
of the rabbinic tribunal. See id at 235. See also Babylonian Talmud; Baba Batra 48a,
Rambam, Mishnah Torah Hilchot Gerushin 2:20, Shulchan Aruch Even Ha-Ezer 134:9.
86. See Bleich, supra note 85, at 235.
87. See id. There are practical differences as well. Although the secular court can
force the husband to appear before the Beit Din, it cannot force the husband to comply
with the findings of the Beit Din. This action thus may be fruitless in resolving the
problem of the agunah. See Elon, supra note 23, at 19.
88. See Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (court has no jurisdiction
to force a husband to give a get); Turner v. Turner, 192 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966) (get provision in ketubah is unenforceable by religious court); Steinberg v.
Steinberg, 1982 WL 2446 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 24, 1982) (get provision is unenforceable
because enforcement would violate the Constitution); Wener v. Wener, 301 N.Y.S.2d 237
(Sup. Ct. 1969) (denying in a child support dispute that the ketubah is an enforceable
contract); Margulies v. Margulies, 344 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 1973) (court would deny
the ability to enforce a contract to give a get).
89. See Turner v. Turner, 192 So.2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (holding that the
chancellor had no statutory authority to impose a provision in the final divorce decree
requiring husband to give wife a get); Steinberg v. Steinberg, 1982 WL 2446 (Ohio Ct.
App. Jun. 24, 1982) (holding that the court could not condition receipt of alimony on the
wife's cooperation in the get process).
90. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law§ 253 (McKinney 1986).
91. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 253 (McKinney 1986). Telephone Interview with David
Zwiebel, Counsel for Agudat Israel (Mar. 9, 1998).
Governor Cuomo's subsequent
statement that if the law is unconstitutional, "our excellent courts will make that clear in
due time," was criticized by the press, which felt that Governor Cuomo had abdicated his
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plaintiff in a civil divorce can ask the judge to require both parties to sign an affidavit specifying that they have removed all
impediments to religious remarriage by the other party?.i Failure to sign the affidavit leads a court to withhold the benefits of
civil divorce. 93 The law only allows plaintiffs to request the affidavit, leaving defendant agunahs still without effective remedy.
Thus, if the defendant wishes to receive the get, this law will not
help her.
In 1992, the New York legislature passed a second get law.94
This law allows judges to take into account religious impediments to remarriage in distributing property, allowing judges to
set a higher level of alimony until a get is executed, subject to
reduction afterwards.95 Agudat Israel, sponsors of the first get
law, has argued that financial penalties for non-participation in
the get process pressures the husband to such an extent that
they eliminate the spouse's ability to give a get free of duress. 96
This interpretation suggests that gets given pursuant to the second get law are invalid because they were compelled.97 Not all
groups agree with this reasoning,98 but the lack of consensus indicates that legislative solutions have complicated the agunah
issue rather than resolved it. A comprehensive solution to the
agunah problem acceptable to the entire Jewish community is
still needed.
V. THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT

The failures of post-nuptial solutions for agunahs have led
constitutional responsibility. Cuomo Signs Law to Block Misuse of Jewish Divorce,
N.Y.L.J. Aug. 10, 1983 at 1.
92. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law§ 253 (McKinney 1986).
93 . See id.
94. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §236 B5 (5) (h) (6) (d) (McKinney 1986).
95. See id. See also Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 210.
96. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Agudat Israel of America at 3; Becher v. Becher, 667
N.Y.S .2d 50, (App. Div. 1997), appeal dismissed, 694 N.E.2d 885 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that
the constitutional issue was moot because the wife had waived all her rights under the
law). Agudat Israel attacked the constitutionality of the law in the amicus brief.
97 . The argument is that this law creates such a strong financial pressure on the
recalcitrant party to give a get as to make the get a get meuseh. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
98. The law received strong support from organizations including the Orthodox
Union, the National Council of Young Israel, and the National Jewish Commission on
Law and Public Affairs. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 209.
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traditional Jewish couples to look toward prenuptial agreements
to address potential problems that may arise in the dissolution of
a marriage. The suggested prenuptial agreement, a civilly en
forceable contract, requires either appearance before a Beit Din
or the giving of a get at the time of a separation or civil divorce.
Two such prenuptial agreements are currently used. One is a
simple arbitration agreement requiring parties to appear before
a designated Beit Din when the couple no longer lives together.99
Some of these prenuptials permit the Beit Din to issue fines
against a party who fails to appear. 100 The second type of pre
nuptial is a document, executed by itself or in addition to an ar
bitration agreement, indicating if the couple separates without a
get, the husband must pay the wife a stipulated sum, either
specified or calculated according to a certain formula.101 Grant
ing the get would end this financial obligation.
These prenuptials create a complicated situation where con
tractual obligations, ordinarily enforceable at common law, are
formed within the context of a religious document. The enforce
ment of these agreements raises several issues. The propriety of
venue must be first addressed: whether secular courts can over
see the fulfillment of these prenuptial agreements. This concern
brings into the discussion the Establishment Clause and the
right to free exercise of religion as articulated in the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Furthermore, even though
secular courts can sit for these cases, their decisions may not be
an effective means of enforcement as their ha/.akhic validity
comes into question.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS PRENUPTIAL
Perhaps the earliest version of a prenuptial agreement akin
to those in use today was suggested over 300 years ago by the
Nachalat Shiva who incorporated such a document into his book

99. See Appendix A. The Orthodox movement neglects the Lieberman clause,
primarily because the indeterminate monetary penalty raises difficulties with the
principle of asmachta. The arbitration agreement can be inserted into the ketubah or
executed separately. See infra Section IV.A. See also infra note 120 and accompanying
text.
100. See id.
101. See Appendix B.
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of standard halakhic forms. 10-..i The Conservative movement pro
duced the first and simplest prenuptial agreement in this cen
tury. In 1954, under the direction of Rabbi Dr. Saul Lieberman,
an arbitration agreement (hereinafter "Lieberman clause") was
incorporated into the traditional ketubah, stating:
[W]e the bride and the bridegroom ... hereby agree to recog
nize the Beth Din of the Rabbinical Assembly and the Jew
ish Theological Seminary of America or its duly appointed
representatives, as having the authority to counsel us in the
light of Jewish tradition which requires husband and wife to
give each other complete love and devotion and to summon
either party at the request of the other in order to enable
the party so requesting to live in accordance with the stan
dards of the Jewish law of marriage throughout his or her
lifetime. We authorize the Beth Din to impose such terms of
compensation as it may see fit for failure to respond to its
summons or to carry out its decision that if one spouse
summons the other to a Jewish court, that party agrees to
go and to be bound by the decision of the Beit Din of the
Rabbinic Assembly100 and the Jewish Theological Seminary
of America. This agreement subjects the recalcitrant party
to fines imposed by the Beit Din in case of refusal to
appear. 104
Many Orthodox versions of a prenuptial agreement also
exist. 105 The Orthodox Caucus, a Modern Orthodox public policy
group, help to disseminate one such version most utilized by the
Orthodox community. 106 This prenuptial agreement consists of
102. See Sefer Nachalat Shiva: Chapter 9. The Nachalat Shiva included such a form
in the Tenaim, the traditional prenuptial contract, which has been through several
incarnations. One of these variations included the amount of the dowry, the financial
agreements between the families, and the financial obligations owed by the parties if one
of them refuses to enter into the marriage. See id.
103. The Rabbinic Assembly and the Jewish Theolo gical Seminary [JTS] are
respectively, the rabbinic organizational arm and the theological seminary of the
Conservative Movement.
104. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. 1983).
105. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 120-44.
106. This agreement wa s later incorporated into a volume by Basil Herring and
Kenneth Auman, The Prenuptial Agreement: Halakhic and Pastoral Considerations 4554 (1996). It should be noted here that prenuptial agreements in general have received
support in the more modern Orthodox community. See Leichman, supra note 64, at Rl.

1999]

Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial Agreements

377

two documents: The first is a binding arbitration agreement,
where a spouse is required to appear before a specified Beit Din
if called by the party. 107 The second is an agreement for a stipu
lated sum of spousal support for every day after the effective end
of the marriage that the husband does not give his wife a get. 108
These agreements are secular documents written in English.109
Because severe financial pressure to give aget can result in a get
meuseh, 110 the stipulated sum is not a fine for failure to give a
get, but rather the sum is intended for financial supportm and is
calculated to be within a reasonable range.112
In another approach, espoused by Professor Irving Breitowitz,
the parties execute two documents before the marriage - a
promissory note by the husband and a release by the wife. 118 In
the case of separation, the note talces effect and the husband
owes the wife a large sum of money. 114 The wife's release is trig
gered by the husband's participation in the get process.115 If the
husband refuses to participate, his promissory note is triggered,
but the wife's release is not. A husband's refusal to grant a get
The community that is more closely affiliated with the Agudat Israel has not endor!Mld
the idea of a standardized prenuptial, perhaps based on a responsa of Rabbi Moshe
Feinstein, the spiritual leader of that community and one of its greatest halalehic voices
of the 20th century. When asked about the binding arbitration agreement, he responded
that it was permissible, and the get was not considered coerced, but one should be
familiar with the couple before broaching the t.opic with them. As some couples will be
scared away from marriage by the discussion of divorce, and as marriage is considered a
religious act, it is important not t.o do anything that may dissuade young couples from
marrying. See lggrot Moshe Even Haezer, VII No. 107 (large volume edition).
107. See Herring and Auman, supra note 106, at 45-4 7 (parties must fill in the name
of the Beit Din they wish to handle their case). Most couples will fill in the name of a
standing Beit Din, such as the Beth Din of the Rabbinic Council of America, a central
body of rabbis who tend to be affiliated with Yeshiva University, or the Beit Din of
Agudat Rabbonim which is affiliated with the Agudat Israel, an organization whose roots
are in Europe and many of whose members are educated in more ultra-Orthodox yeshioot.
See id.
108. See id. This document was initially drafted by Rabbi Mordechai Willig at the
behest of the Orthodox Caucus. It has since been adopted by the Rabbinical Council of
America [RCA], a Modern Orthodox umbrella group, which has recommended that all of
its members utilize this agreement when performing marriages.
109. As opposed t.o the Lieberman clause, which is in Aramaic as part of the ketubah.
See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 80.
111. See Herring, supra note 106, at 60.
112. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 119.
113. See id. at 119. See also Irwin Haut, Divorce in Jewish Law (1987).
114. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 119.
115. See id.
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gives the wife a legally enforceable promissory note against the
husband.116

VI.

ENFORCEABILITY OF THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN CIVIL
COURTS

A.

VALIDITY OF DOCUMENTS

The prenuptial agreement must be a legally binding
agreement, which generally has not been problematic with self
contained prenuptials, because experienced lawyers usually draft
them. The more difficult issue is that the standard hallmarks of
a contract are often absent in religious prenuptials, as they are
rarely freely negotiated.117 Typically, the rabbi gives the couple a
completed prenuptial agreement.m Therefore, the legal implica
tions of the prenuptial often are not fully explained to the couple
before the signing. 119 While couples could consult with lawyers,
many view the signing of the document as a ritual and do not
seek legal advice. Some rabbis reinforce this ritualistic sense of
the agreement by having the couple sign a prenuptial in Hebrew
as well as in English. 120
While few cases have addressed the enforceability of re
ligious prenuptials, the New York Court of Appeals inAvitzur v.
Avitzur121 upheld the Lieberman clause. 122 In Avitzur, the couple
116. See id.
117. Religious prenuptials are normally given to the couple by the rabbi who is
officiating at the marriage. While sometimes the rabbi will give the couple the prenuptial
agreement in advance of the wedding, the prenuptial is often presented immediately
preceding the wedding ceremony, thus leaving the couple without the opportunity of
consulting an attorney.
118. See Rabbi Reuven P. Bulka, The Rabbinical Council of America Lifecycle
Madrikh (1977). This book, directed at rabbis, contains several lifecycle documents,
including a prenuptial. See id. at 69-77.
119. See id.
120. The addition of a Hebrew version is especially difficult with the Lieberman
clause, because very often the couple does not know the meaning of the ketubah, since it
is in Aramaic or Hebrew. While the couple may have been advised that the clause is
present before participating in the ketubah ceremony, it is very possible for a couple to
sign a ketubah without being aware of the clause. This has become increasingly
problematic as many couples select their ketubah from Judaica shops based on the
artistic merit of the document. Thus, a couple could literally purchase a document with
this clause contained in it without any knowledge that it is there.
121. 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
122. See id. at 573.
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had been married in a Jewish ceremony utilizing a ketubah con
taining the Lieberman clause. 1:1a A civil court granted the hus
band a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhumane
treatment. i:14 The wife then wished to bring the defendant hus
band before a Beit Din in order to receive a religious divorce, but
he refused to appear. 1:l:i The wife argued that the ketubah was a
marriage contract that the husband breached. She sought a ju
dicial declaration to that effect and specific performance of the
requirement that he appear before a Beit Din. 126 The court en
forced the Lieberman clause in the Conservative ketubah. Ap
plying equity principles, it held that a legally valid agreement
should not escape enforceability simply because it appears in a
religious document. The Court stated:
[T]he contractual obligation plaintiff seeks to enforce is
closely analogous to an antenuptial agreement to arbitrate a
dispute in accordance with the law and tradition chosen by
the parties. There can be little doubt that a duly executed
antenuptial agreement, by which the parties agree in ad
vance of the marriage to the resolution of disputes that may
arise after its termination, is valid and enforceable. 127
B.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

Courts have tended to brush over the question of constitu
tionality in the cases that have addressed the get issue, in an
attempt to avoid an inequitable solution. 128 For instance, in
Burns, the court dismissed the constitutional issues with a few
lines, noting that religious faith was not at issue because the
husband would have been willing to give a get for an amount of
money. 129 However, the First Amendment issues raised by the
use of these prenuptial agreements cannot be so conveniently
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 574.
128. See Bums v. Burns, 538 A.2d 438, 440 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). See also
Koepell v. Koepell, 138 N.Y.S. 2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (forcing defendant husband to fulfill
an earlier agreement to appear before a rabbinical court is not unconstitutional).
129. See Bums, 538 A.2d 438 at 439.
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evaded.
Tension exists between the Establishment Clause,130 which
proscribes the state from advancing religion, and the Free Exercise Clause,131 which prohibits government restrictions on the
practice of religion. 132 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment makes these guarantees applicable to the states.133
The Supreme Court analyzes these two prongs of the First
Amendment - the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause - under different tests. Thus, state action must not run
afoul of either the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause to be
constitutional. The difficulty lies in the application of Supreme
Court tests for these two clauses to state court enforcement of
these prenuptial agreements.
1. The Establishment C/,ause
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 134 the Supreme Court set forth a
three-prong test for determining Establishment Clause violations. Lemon requires that government actions: (1) have a
secular purpose, (2) a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and (3) avoids creating an "excessive government entanglement with religion" which might erode the principle of government neutrality in religious decision-making.135
a. Secu/,ar Purpose
Enforcement of a religious prenuptial serves secular objectives. While the removal of barriers to religious remarriage does
not seem to be a "secular purpose," if the get is not given after a
civil divorce, the parties may not remarry, although they are divorced in the eyes of the state. Since one of the purposes of a
civil divorce is to permit the parties to remarry, assuring their
ability to remarry can be construed as serving an important
130. U.S. Const. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion")
131. U.S. Const. Amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law . .. prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.")
132. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise); Everson v. Bd.
of Ed., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause). ·
133. U .S. Const. amend. XIV.
134. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
135. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 611.
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"secular purpose." 136 Moreover, the prenuptial, if properly
. drafted and executed, is a valid contract to which the parties
agreed.m The state has an obvious interest in enforcing valid
contracts.138 While this contract does involve religious issues, the
law has enforced contracts that are more deeply entangled in
religion. For example, the Illinois Court of Appeals enforced a
prenuptial agreement that required the children of a marriage to
be raised as Jews. 139
b. Primary Effect
The second prong of Lemon requires that the state action
have the primary effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting re
ligion.140 The question of what exactly constitutes a "primary
effect" does not have a clear answer. One possibility emerging
from Establishment Clause cases is that "primary effect" is syn
onymous "'.ith "direct and immediate" as opposed to "indirect and
attenuated." 141 A "direct" effect is one which is precisely the re
sult that the operation of the statute produces. 142 Some argue
that the prenuptial advances religion by compelling participation
in a religious "ceremony" in which one party does not want to
partake.143 Although a religious element exists in the enforcing
of the prenuptial, the more immediate and direct effects include
appearing before a specific tribunal or providing financial sup
port to an ex-spouse. Additionally, the court's enforcement of a
contract would have the effect of giving agunahs the option of
remarriage, which is as much of a secular act as a religious
one.144 Thus, enforcement of these contracts does not directly
advance religion.

136. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138-39 (N.Y. 1983).
137. See In re Sunshine, 357 N.E. 2d 999 (N. Y. 1976); see also Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at
137 (holding a prenuptial contained within a ketubah is enforceable and subject t:o
specific performance).
138. The right t:o enter int:o contracts is recognized by both the federal and state
constitutions. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I,§ 10; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I §16.
139. See Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 175 N.E.2d 619 (Ill. 1961).
140. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
141. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 26.
142. See Irving Breitowitz,The Plight of the Agunah; A Study in Halacha, Contract,
and the First Amendment, 51 Md. L. Rev. 312,387.
143. See, e.g., Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983).
144. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 88-89.
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c. Excessive Entanglement
Courts have interpreted the third prong of the Lemon test,
the excessive entanglement prong, as a ban on extensive government monitoring of religious activity ,145 or alternatively, as a
prohibition on courts deciding religious questions.146 A binding
arbitration prenuptial involves the fewest entanglement problems if it requires arbitration before an institutional Beit Din. If
the prenuptial agreement specifies a standing Beit Din, the prenuptial can simply function like a binding arbitration agreement
subject to judicial enforcement. 147 When a Beit Din is not specified, the prenuptial can potentially enmesh the secular court in
the selection of a particular religiqus tribunal, which might violate the entanglement prong. 148
The Establishment Clause may be implicated in regard to
monetary support payments if the parties disagree over the religious sufficiency of the get or participation in the get process. 149
In most cases, however, the enforcement of the monetary support
agreement is not problematic; the court only determines if a
spouse has been given a sufficient end to the marriage.150 Such
an inquiry will rarely result in the government having to make
deep determinations of religious policy. 151 To pass the entanglement prong of Lemon, both the drafters of the prenuptial agreement and the judges involved need to tread carefully.

2. Alternatives to the Lemon Test
Justice O'Connor has suggested an alternative standard to
the Lemon test. Hi:! Her "endorsement test" focuses on the issue
whether the government act tends to convey a message of en145. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 220 (1997).
146.See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979).
147. See Martin Domke, Domke on Commercial Arbitration 441. See also Lieberman
v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
148. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (First Amendment severely limits courts from
involving hemselves in questions involving religious doctrine).
149. This is because of the issue of asmachta. See infra Section VI.
150. This is because of the issue of asmachta . See infra Section VI.
151. See Jones , 443 U.S. at 602 (1979). Judicial involvement is permitted to the extent that it can be accomplished in purely secular terms, i.e. the application of objective,
well-established principles of secular law. Many of the prenuptial cases may be resolvable by the application of secular contract law.
152. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring).
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dorsement or disapproval to religion. 15:1 In All.egheny County v.
ACLU, 154 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, decided that
the placing of a creche on the staircase of the Allegheny County
courthouse violated the Establishment Clause because "the [Es
tablishment] Clause ... prohibits government from appearing to
take a position on questions of religious belief."155 In Lee v.
Weismann, 156 the Court held that a clergyman reciting an invoca
tion and benediction at a public high school graduation violated
the Establishment Clause because the government's involvement
with religion was pervasive. 157 It is "beyond dispute that at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exer
cise. " 158
Enforcement could be construed as judicial coercion of par
ticipation in religion, in violation of Lee. Such a conclusion
would be tenuous, however, as courts would be simply enforcing
an agreement to which the parties themselves have freely bar
gained. They are not required to take a position on religious
questions. 159 This position has the support of many scholars,
who have argued that granting a get is not a "religious" act, but
rather a contractual one. 160 Therefore, even if there is judicial
coercion to appear before a Beit Din or to grant a get, the re
quired act is secular and thus, outside the scope of the Estab
lishment Clause. 161
A binding arbitration agreement has greater difficulty in not
violating the Establishment Clause. Even if the agreement
specifies a standing Beit Din, under Lynch and Lee, sending the
parties to a religious court may be considered endorsement or
coercion. If the prenuptial specifies a zabla situation162 that
could involve the court in determining who should sit on the Beit
Din, it might implicate All.egheny County by requiring the court
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See id.
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Id. at 574.
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
See id.
Id. at 587.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688; Al.legheny, 492 U.S. at 574.
See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
See Minkin, 434 A.2d at 668.
See supra Section I and note 58.
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to take a position on religious beliefs.163 However, the court
could chose to ignore the religious nature of the Beit Din and
treat it simply as an arbitration panel.164
Despite recent Supreme Court criticism of umon, it has
failed to elucidate a single standard for Establishment cases.165
Thus, one cannot conclusively determine the constitutionality of
secular court enforcement of prenuptial agreements.

3. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids the government from imposing burdens on, or giving benefits to, people because of their religious beliefs.166 Again, the Supreme Court has
failed to articulate a single test for Free Exercise questions.167
In Sherbert v. Verner, 168 the Court applied strict scrutiny to
analyze the Free Exercise issue. 169 It articulated a two-prong,
balancing test to determine if a government act violated this part
of the First Amendment. The government bears the burden of
showing a compelling interest in its act and proof that its act is
the least restrictive means to active its goal.170 As a prerequisite
for this test, the Court required a showing of interference with a
party's sincere religious belief.171 The Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 112 enumerated factors to determine whether a particular religious belief is "sincerely held." These included: the
length of time the belief has been held; the importance of the belief to everyday practice; the nature of the belief, either personal
or communal; and the origins of the belief.m
163. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 610 (1989).
164. Agreements t.o have a matter arbitrated in an alternative forum have been
generally upheld. See Martin Domke, supra note 146, §4.19 at 3 (pocket part, August
1998). See also In re Sunshine, 357 N.E.2d 999 (N.Y. 1976); In re Davis, 228 N.E.2d 768
(N.Y. 1967).
165. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J ., dissenting).
166. See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rottunda, Constitutional Law §17.2 at 1221
(5th ed. 1991).
167. See Lauren Freeman, The Child's Best Interests vs. The Free Exercise of
Religion, 32 Col. J . L. Soc. Prob. 73 (1998).
168. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 406.
171. See id.
172. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
173. See id. at 215.
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The application of a Free Exercise analysis to the prenuptial
agreement rests on whether requiring the giving of a get or the
submission of a party to ecclesiastical court arbitration of a get,
constitutes a burden on a sincerely-held, religious belief. Courts
have found that the giving of a get is not a "religious act," since it
does not require the profession of a particular faith.174 Also, ex
perts have testified that the body of halakha can be divided into
two distinct categories: laws governing the relationship between
a person and God and laws governing relations between
persons.175
J. David Bleich, professor of Jewish law at Cardozo Law
School, has also argued that the get is secular. First, he states
that a get is an institution that "gains effect solely through the
actions of the parties themselves," and cancels - by mutual con
sent - a contractual relationship. Furthermore, Bleich argues
that a get is not a religious act because it does not involve a "con
fession of faith." A court of Jewish law would see its execution as
routine, as would be a rescission of contract, or the execution of a
promissory note by a state court. 176 Many civil courts have ac
cepted this premise that a get is not a religious act177- in one
case, after hearing the expert testimony of four rabbis.1711 In Ko
epell, 119 for example, the court held that the appearance of the
husband before a rabbinic tribunal to "answer questions and give
evidence needed by them to make a decision is not a profession of
faith." 180 Other courts have accepted similar arguments.1111
174. See Minkin, 434 A.2d at 667-68.
175. See id.
176. See Bleich, supra note 85, at 233
177. See Scholl v. Scholl, 621 A.2d 808 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1992). The court ordered the
husband to give his wife a get per stipulation of the settlement, because although the
court could not require the husband to participat.e in religious ceremony, here the court
was simply ordering him to do what he had promised. See also Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d
438 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (requiring the husband to assist the wife in getting a
get does not violat.e First Amendment).
178. Minkin, 434 A.2d at 667-69. The rabbis variously t.estified that "the get does not
involve a religious ceremony or require a rabbi's presence, and although the husband is
required to take the initiative, he does not have to be a believer, state any doctrine or
creed, or even acknowledge his Jewishness"; "the document contains no reference to God's
name"; and "the get is a general release document where the husband releases the wife
and frees her to marry in compliance with the ketubah contract." Id.
179. Koepell v. Koepell, 138 N.Y.S. 2d 366, 373 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
180. Id. See also Bleich, supra note 85, at 230 n.88 ("It should be noted here that the
court did not understand the nature of the get . . . . [H]owever, the salient point, namely
that no 'profession of faith is involved' is entirely true.").
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This conclusion, however, has not been universally accepted,
as a profession of faith is not necessary for all religious acts.182
Though Jewish law can be divided into two categories, interpersonal and theological, both categories are considered divine in
origin, and performance of either is a religious obligation, a positive religious act.183 "Judaic law is only secular in the very limited sense that it deals with many of the subjects that are commonly dealt with under non-religious law such as contracts, tort
and agency." 184 Thus, the giving of a get can be construed as
demonstrating a belief in the authority of Jewish law above civil
law, as well as a belief in the rabbinic system. Such a view may
be valid, but prior case law suggests that courts have been more
likely to find that the refusal to give or receive a get is not a religious act. 185
What makes the Free Exercise analysis particularly difficult
when applied to the issue of enforcement of the prenuptial binding arbitration or support agreement is determining which individual's religious right is being preserved. On one side, the recalcitrant party could claim the right not to be compelled to
submit to a particular religious ceremony. Alternatively, the
state's refusal to enforce a valid prenuptial contract may violate
the Free Exercise rights of the party who wishes to remarry, and
"to exclude from contractual agreement areas that impinge upon
religious practice is to interfere with the free exercise of religion. nl86
Courts articulated several rationales for requiring the recalcitrant party to participate in the divorce, believing the impact on
him to be slight. 187 First, they have held found that if the recalcitrant party freely participated in the ketubah ceremony, it is not
"such a violation" of his Free Exercise rights to force him to appear before a religious tribunal. 188 Also, courts have not accepted
181. See supra notes 76, 176 and accompanying text.
182. The Babylonian Talmud: Kiddushim 41b notes the get is "h.ol", not religious.
However, this may just be in the context of the particular discussion of the holy priestly
offering, and not in a context of a larger discussion of secular verses religious. See id.
183. See Elon, supra note 23, at 5.
184. Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 353.
185. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Stern v. Stern, 5 Family L. Rep. (BNA) 2810-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
188. Id. See also In Re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N .E .2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990);
Roth v. Roth, Civ. No. 79-192709 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1980).
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the argument that enforcement violated the recalcitrant party's
religious beliefs in cases where there is evidence that he would
give the get for monetary concessions. 189 Finally, courts have
found that participation in the get process is not · a religious
act. 190 The last two responses, finding that the parties were in
sincere or that the get is not a religious act, are suspect because
they require court inquiry into the nature of the religious belief
and act.
4. Religious Accommodation

The Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine of religious
accommodation in Zorach v. Cl,auson. 191 "Reasonable accommo
dation" allows the government to make exceptions for those
whose religious beliefs would be violated by a particular govern
ment action: 19:.i
The nation is understood not as secular, but as pluralistic.
Religion is under no special disability in public life; indeed,
it is at least as protected and encouraged as any other form
of belief - and in some ways, morE< so. The idea of an ac
commodation of religion, which is foreign to the religion
clauses, based on strict neutrality interpretation, follows
naturally from the pluralist understanding. 1911
The conflict between the prohibition of the Establishment Clause
and the necessity, or at least permissibility, of reasonable ac
commodation has never been definitively resolved.194
The Sherbert and Yoder decisions were two rare cases where
the government granted a religious-based exemption from a law
of general applicability. 195 These cases precipitated Employment
Division v. Smith,196 where the Court seemed to hold that ac189. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d. 438, 440 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
190. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
191. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
192. Id.
193. Michael W. McConnel, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
194. See Breitowitz, supra note 142, at 350.
195. See Nowak, supra note 165, at 1290.
196. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). One such exception would be where law is designed
specifically to burden religious beliefs. This type of law was the subject of the Church of
Lukumi Babaly Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 420 (1993). Such a law will be subject to strict
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commodation in the face of a generally applicable law is not usually required. The Court in Smith suggested that a legislative
accommodation of religion might be possible, but is not constitutionally mandated. 197 It held that the government is prohibited
from regulating religious beliefs, including using religious doctrine as a basis for judicial decisions. 198 Furthermore, the Court
found the Free Exercise Clause invalidates a law, though facially
neutral, if it can be shown that the purpose of the law is to burden religious belief. 199
Breitowitz divides the reconciliation of reasonable accommodation into three theoretical frameworks.:.roo At one extreme is a
position of strict neutrality, in which it is constitutionally impermissible for a court to grant religious exemption from neutral
legislation.201 At the other is the position that the government
may remove barriers or costs of religion when such accommodations are "reasonable." A third option takes an intermediate position in allowing the state, acting under the Free Exercise
Clause, to remove those barriers that result from governmental
action and retain other barriers that arise under Establishment
Clause. 202 This type of accommodation is deemed "reasonable"
because in situations where strict application of the Free Exercise Clause would result in hardship, the courts will remove it to
the extent permissible by the Establishment Clause.203
Under this last understanding of accommodation, certain judicial actions - even if they enforce an agreement to appear before a rabbinic court - should not constitute compelled specific
performance of a religious obligation. The judicial action in
question involves the removal of barriers resulting from governmental action and would result in severe hardship to the spouse
scrutiny by the courts and the compelling interest test. See Nowak, supra note 165, at
1292-93.
197. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 192-93.
201. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing exemption from
statute by Amish) with Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U .S. 599 (1961) (upholding the
constitutionality of "blue laws" that made it difficult for Saturday Sabbath observers to
make a living).
202. See Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev 743
(1992).
203. See Nowak, supra note 165, at 128~90.
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who wishes the divorce if the agreement to appear before rab
binic court is not enforced. This reasonable accommodation prin
ciple, however, would also prevent the courts from enforcing spe
cific performance of a religious obligation or discipline.204 Such
action would excessively entangle the judiciary in religious mat
ters.
Thus, even if the granting of a get is found to be a "religious
act" and judicial involvement unconstitutional, a court could be
able to enforce a prenuptial agreement to effect a degree of relief
for the party that wishes a get under the theory of reasonable
accommodation.
C. REMEDY IN TORT
Another means to award relief to an agunah through the civil
courts may be through bringing suit against. the recalcitrant
party for intentional infliction of emotional distress.205 Such a
claim arises when "by extreme and outrageous conduct [the tort
feasor] intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional dis
tress to another.":.!06 The action must be "so outrageous in char
acter l¼nd so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community. "207 Conduct is "outrageous"
if the tortfeasor knows that a particular act will unusually dis
tress the plaintiff.:!08
Courts have been reluctant to apply this tort in general, and
to spousal relationships in particular, for fear of abuse of the
court system.:!09 Since agunah cases are relatively infrequent as
compared with other intra-spousal disputes, permitting a suit
based on emotional distress of the agunah would not unduly
burden the courts. Additionally, the agunah's predicament is a
204.

See Rubin v. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Fam. Ct. 1973) (distinguishing between
138 N.Y.S.2d 366, and Margulies v. Margulies, 344 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div.
1973), on grounds that the court was not attempting t.o enforce religious discipline, but
rather was enforcing other relief for a party who refused t.o participate in an agreement,
and the actions which were a condition precedent t.o receiving relief, happened t.o have
religious significance).
205. Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 46 cmt. f(l965). See also generally Prosser and
Keet.on the Law of Torts§54 at 364-65, and nn.57-61, § 122 at 901-05.
206. Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 46, at 1 (1955).
207. Id. at§ 46 cmt. d.
208. Id. at§ 46 cmt. f.
209. See Breit.owitz, supra note 3, at 239 n.703.

Koepell,
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prototypical emotional distress cause of action - namely, a case
where one party knowingly exploits the sensitivities of the other
party. 210 If an agunah's emotional distress claim is successful,
then the court only can provide the remedy of a financial payment, and not specific performance.211 The agunah can then use
the court-ordered remedy as leverage against her spouse. The
damage award may therefore have the same monetary effect as a
prenuptial support agreement.2 12
Such a tort action would not violate the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause test as defined in Lemon. 213 The claim serves
the secular purpose of punishing tortfeasors and it neither advances nor inhibits religion. Furthermore, it does not involve
excessive entanglement because the only factual determinations
implicating religion are that the wife does not have a get and
that she will not remarry without one.
Under the Yoder standard, violation of the Free Exercise
Clause turns on whether the giving of a get constitutes a "sincerely held belief. "214 Since courts have held that the get is a
secular agreement,2 15 they would probably find that the giving of
a get fails the Yoder standard.
Even under the Smith
standard,2 16 courts would hear this action because it does not
involve accommodation. Thus, tort law may provide an effective
avenue for women who did not sign a prenuptial agreement.
VII. HALAKHIC VALIDITY OF THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT

The question of ha/,a,khic validity further complicates the
drafting of a constitutional and enforceable prenuptial agreement. A prenuptial agreement that results in a get given in exchange for debt forgiveness by a civil court decision, or out of fear
of further litigation, will probably be considered a compelled divorce, and thus invalid under Jewish law.2 17
210. See id. at 240.
211. Patti L. Scott, Divorce Law and the Religion Clause; An Unconstitutional
Exorcism of the Jewish Get Law, 6 Set.on Const. L.J. 1117 (1996) at 1189.
212. However, this tactic may raise halakhic problems, because of the problem of get
meuseh . See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
213. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 611 (1971).
214. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
215. See supra note 76 and accompaying test.
216. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
217. See discussion of get meuseh, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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There are two primary issues with regard to the ha/,akhic va
lidity of a prenuptial agreement. The first is the problem of the
get meuseh, or coerced get.218 The court in Margulies v. Margu
lies, for instance, noted that jailing the husband for contempt for
his refusal to give a get, would not be effective because any get
subsequently given would be coerced and therefore invalid.2 19
The second principle relates to a definition of "freely given." This
is the issue of the mens rea (known in Jewish law as asmachta)
of the parties at the time the prenuptial agreement was signed.
At Jewish law, for a contract to be valid an individual must
have fully anticipated and accepted all contingencies. This in
validates contractual penalties in most cases because it is ex
pected that a party would not enter into a contract assuming
non-performance.220 Thus, the contractual penalties in most
cases of non-performance are invalid, because the expectation is
that the party did not enter into the contract with the assump
tion that he would not perform his part.221 If the party had truly
expected the contingency to occur, he would not have accepted
the penalties.222 The clause, then, was not "freely" agreed to ret
roactively voiding the contract. This asmachta principle as
sumes that an individual cannot contract into accepting a pen
alty in the case for refusing to participate in the get process be
cause the individual would not believe that such a situation
would arise.l!23 Thus, any prenuptial that contains monetary
damages must make clear that the money is for something other
than a penalty for non-compliance, i.e., for spousal support.224
Unfortunately, agreements that avoid monetary awards, such
as a binding arbitration, often do not offer much to compel the
218. See supra Section I.
219. See Margulies v. Margulies, 344 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 1973).
220. 1 Encyclopedia Talmudit, "Asmachta" at 10-19 (1973).
221. See id.
222. Rambam, Mishnah Torah, Hilchot Mecirah, 11:4.
223. Cf. id.
224. A person can accept an obligation to support someone else unconditionally for a
specified period.
See Babylonian Talmud: Ketubot 101b (one can support his
stepdaughter for the period of her marriage). It has been extrapolated that one can make
this agreement with one's own wife, despite her halakhic status as a rebellious wife or
moredet, which would remove her husband's obligation to support her. In addition, a
husband can waive his right to a wife's earnings and property, which is generally
assumed in Jewish law. Even HaEzer 113, Beit Shmuel 2, Even HaEzer 134 Pitchai
Teshuvah 9. However, in order to avoid the problem of asmachta, it is preferable to
specify the amount, and have that amount directly correlate to the costs of support.
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recalcitrant party to participate in the get process. Thus, while a
court can enforce a binding arbitration agreement and can compel the parties to appear before a Beit Din, there is little that the
Beit Din can do to compel the get itself.2'25 If the Beit Din instructs the husband to give his wife a divorce, then (constitutional issues aside) the order is enforceable in civil court since it
is the finding of a valid arbitration panel.226 However, a get
given under penalty of punishment by the civil court may be void
as a get meuseh. An enforceable agreement that imposes monetary payments for refusal to give the get can avoid these halakhic
and constitutional problems while giving real enforceability to
the agreement.
As for the problem of asmachta, the monetary amount must
not be a penalty for non-performance, but rather an amount related to something else.2'27 To avoid the problem of get meuseh,
the monetary amount must be low enough to allow the husband
to make a reasonable choice,2'28 rather than an amount which is
so onerous as to force him to give the get. Thus, under civil law,
the recalcitrant party has three options: payment, granting the
get, or imprisonment. If he is jailed for failing to pay, he can
then chose to pay or give the get. Because payments exists as a
reasonable alternative, giving a get is not the only option available to him and the get is not considered coerced. However,
where payment is well beyond the means of the individual, it is
no longer reasonable, and a get given as a result would be invalid
due to duress.2'29
While the issues oftheget meuseh andasmachta are the most
critical to the halakhic validity of the prenuptial, the practicality
of the prenuptial as a real-life solution has halakhic implications
as well. If the arbitration agreement allows all divorce settlement issues, rather than those involving the get, to be referred to
the Beit Din, the Beit Din can choose to apply Jewish law of
225. See supra Section I.
226. See Domke, supra note 146, at 441.
227. See Breitowtiz, supra note 3, at 133-34.
228. See id. While this may appear to be a legal fiction, the ability to make a realistic
choice determines the validity of the get. Thus, the monetary amount selected must be
one that is within reason for the couple - an amount that is too low would render it
insignificant, however, and an amount that is too high might leave the spouse with no
reasonable choice in deciding to give the get . See id.
229. See Breitowitz, supra note 142, at 373 n.268.
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spousal distribution instead of state law.230 Under Jewish law, a
husband has an obligation to support his wife.:'-31 In exchange for
the husband's support, the wife gives her earnings to the hus
band.232
There are no provisions for on-going support after divorce,
with the exception of the money allocated in the ketubah.233 A
Beit Din would normally assign more than simply the ketubah to
the woman. However, for a woman to receive what she would at
civil law, the prenuptial agreements must address the reality of
halakhic distribution.234 The simplest solution is for the prenup
tial to state explicitly that the Beit Din will decide issues of prop
erty distribution according to the laws of a particular state.235
Alternatively, the agreement could insert a clause whereby the
husband renounces his right to his wife's earnings from the time
that they are no longer living together. A carefully drafted pre
nuptial agreement c an thus both be halakhic and put parties in a
fair financial position.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Prenuptial agreements seem to be the best means to prevent
future agunot within the Jewish community. They initiate the
230. See Isaac Herzog, The Main Institutions of Jewish Law 32 (1980). It should be
noted that the agreement that the RCA endorses contains a provision that directs the
arbitration of monetary disputes to the Beit Din. Many object to the inclusion of the
monetary disputes in the arbitration. They feel that the current secular laws of equitable
distribution and maintenance favor women more than Torah Law does. Halakhically
however, these disputes belong in the Beit Din, unless Beit Din allows the parties t.o
resolve them in court. According t.o many halakhic interpret.ors, if both parties agree that
Beit Din should base their decisions upon secular law as well as Torah law, the Beit Din
will do so. See Prenuptial agreement, Introduction for Officiating Rabbi, pg. 3 in
Accompanying notes t.o Agunah Conference, held at Cardozo Law School in 1993.
231. See Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 69:2. This obligation is formalized in the
ketubah, but it exists independently of any formal agreement. See Elon, supra note 23, at
390.
232. See Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 80:1 ("The work of her hands is t.o go t.o her
husband.n). The wife can choose t.o keep them if she forgoes her husband's support. See
id.
233. See id.
234. Note that some Batei Din will assign equitable distribution, or something akin t.o
such a value. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
235. It should be noted, however, that any cll8t.ody agreement, even if decided by
mutual decision, could be overturned by the state if the state determines that it is not in
the best interests of the child. See Mookin and Wiesberg, Child, Family and State, 819
(3rd ed. 1995). For an example of such a clause, see Appendix A.
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first crucial step towards getting the parties before a Beit Din.
The prenuptial allows the subject of the get to be dealt with prospectively rather than retroactively. As a result, recourse will be
available with a certain degree of certainty. Additionally, the
prenuptial agreement makes couples address these issues when
they are committed to each other, and not later, when there may
be discord.
The advantages of the prenuptial, however, are not guaranteed. Civil court judges are often wary of alternate forums, especially ecclesiastical tribunals that are vulnerable to charges of
corruption.236 As a result, many civil court judges would prefer
to adjudicate the prenuptial agreement in their own court.
The effectiveness of the prenuptial also depends on the support of the rabbis because they must explain to couples the importance of entering into such an agreement. In addition, couples must recognize the civil law nature of the document. While
only with widespread use can prenuptial agreements function as
an effective solution, they should be implemented wherever rabbinic and community leaders will support them, in the hope that
the signing of a version of the agreement will eventually become
an accepted and established norm throughout the Jewish community.

236.

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A: ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE
Basil Herring and Kenneth Auman
The Prenuptial Agreement 49 (1996)
Memorandum of Agreement made this __ day of ___ 57
which is the __ day of__ 199_ in the City of __
State/Province of __, between __, the husband-to-be who
presently lives at _ and the wife-to-be _- who presently lives
at ___. The parties are shortly to be married.
I Should a dispute arise between the parties after they are mar
ried, Heaven forbid, so that they do not live together as husband
and wife, they agree to refer their marital dispute to an arbitration panel, namely the Beit Din of ____for a binding decision. Each of the parties agrees to appear in person before the
Beit Din at the demand of the other party.
II. The decision of the parties, or a majority of them, shall be
fully enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction.
III. (a) The parties agree that the Beit Din is authorized to de
cide all issues related to a get (Jewish divorce) as well as any is
sues arising from premarital agreements (e.g. ketubah, tena'im)
entered into by the husband and wife.
[The following three clauses (b,c,d) are optional, each to be sepa
rately included or excluded by mutual consent, when signing this
agreement.]
(b) The parties agree that the Beit Din is authorized to decide
any other monetary disputes that might arise between them.
(c) The parties agree that the Beit Din is authorized to decide
issues of child support, visitation and custody (if both parties
consent to the inclusion of this provision in the arbitration at the
time that the arbitration itself begins.)
(d) In deciding disputes pursuant to paragraph III(b) the parties
agree that the Beit Din shall apply the equitable distribution law
of the State/Provision of ___, as interpreted as of the date of
this agreement, to any property disputes which may arise be
tween them, the division of their property and questions of sup-
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port. Notwithstanding any other provisions of the equitable distribution law, the Beit Din may take into account the respective
responsibilities of the parties for the end of the marriage, as an
additional, but not exclusive factor, in determining the distribution of marital property and support obligations.
IV. Failure of either party to perform his or her obligations under this agreement shall make that party liable for all costs
awarded by either a Beit Din or a court of competent jurisdiction,
including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by one side in order to obtain the other party's performance of terms of this
agreement.
V. (a) In the event any of the Beit Din members are unwilling or
unable to serve, then their successors shall serve in their place.
If there are no successors, the parties will at the time of the arbitration choose a mutually acceptable Beit Din. If no such Beit
Din can be agreed upon, the parties shall each choose one member of the Beit Din and the two members selected in this way
shall choose the third member. The decision of the Beit Din shall
be made in accordance with Jewish law (halakha) and/or the
general principles of arbitration and equity (pesharah) customarily employed by rabbinic tribunals.
(b) At any time, should there be a division of opinion among the
members of the Beit Din, the decision of the majority of the
members of the Beit Din shall be the decision of the Beit Din.
Should any of the members of the Beit Din remain in doubt as to
the proper decision, resign, withdraw, or refuse or become unable
to perform duties, the remaining members shall render a decision. Their decision shall be that of the Beit Din for the purposes
of this agreement.
(c) In the event of the failure of either party to appear before it
upon reasonable notice, the Beit Din may issue its decision despite the defaulting party's failure to appear.
VI. This agreement may be signed in one or more copies each
one of which shall be considered an original.
VII. This agreement constitutes a fully enforceable arbitration
agreement.
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VIII. The parties acknowledge that each of them have been
given the opportunity prior to signing this agreement to consult
with their own rabbinic advisor and legal advisor.
In witness of all of the above, the Bride and Groom have entered
into this agreement in the City of ____, State/Province of
Groom
Signature
Name
Address

Bride
Signature
Name
Address

